Abstract. Our input is a complete graph G = (V, E) on n vertices where each vertex has a strict ranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globally stable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching M ′ : here each vertex casts a vote for the matching in {M, M ′ } where it gets a better assignment. Popular matchings need not exist in the given instance G and the popular matching problem is to decide whether one exists or not. The popular matching problem in G is easy to solve for odd n. Surprisingly, the problem becomes NP-hard for even n, as we show here.
Introduction
Consider a complete graph G = (V, E) on n vertices where each vertex ranks all other vertices in a strict order of preference. Such a graph is called a roommates instance with complete preferences. The problem of computing a stable matching in G is a classical and well-studied problem. Recall that a matching M is stable if there is no blocking pair with respect to M , i.e., a pair (u, v) where both u and v prefer each other to their respective assignments in M .
Stable matchings need not always exist in a roommates instance. For example, the instance given in d0 : d1 > d2 > d3 d1 : d2 > d3 > d0 d2 : d3 > d1 > d0 d3 : d1 > d2 > d0 Irving [16] gave an efficient algorithm to decide if G admits a stable matching or not. In this paper we consider a notion that is more relaxed than stability: this is the notion of popularity. For any vertex u, a ranking over neighbors can be extended naturally to a ranking over matchings as follows: u prefers matching M to matching M ′ if (i) u is matched in M and unmatched in M ′ or (ii) u is matched in both and u prefers M (u) to M ′ (u). For any two matchings M and M ′ , let φ(M, M ′ ) be the number of vertices that prefer M to M ′ .
Definition 1. Let M be any matching in G. M is popular if φ(M, M
Suppose an election is held between M and M ′ where each vertex casts a vote for the matching that it prefers. So φ(M, M ′ ) (similarly, φ(M ′ , M )) is the number of votes for M (resp., M ′ ). A popular matching M never loses an election to another matching M ′ since φ(M, M ′ ) ≥ φ(M ′ , M ): thus it is a weak Condorcet winner [4, 5] in the corresponding voting instance. So popularity can be regarded as a natural notion of "global stability".
The notion of popularity was first introduced in bipartite graphs in 1975 by Gärdenfors-popular matchings always exist in bipartite graphs since stable matchings always exist here [9] and every stable matching is popular [10] . The proof that every stable matching is popular holds in nonbipartite graphs as well [3] ; in fact, it is easy to show that every stable matching is a min-size popular matching [13] . Relaxing the constraint of stability to popularity allows us to find globally stable matchings that may exist in instances that do not admit stable matchings; moreover, even when stable matchings exist, there may be popular matchings that achieve more "social good" (such as larger size) in many applications.
Observe that the instance in Fig. 1 has two popular matchings:
However as was the case with stable matchings, popular matchings also need not always exist in the given instance G. The popular roommates problem is to decide if G admits a popular matching or not. When the graph is not complete, it is known that the popular roommates problem is NP-hard [8, 11] . Here we are interested in the complexity of the popular matching problem when the input instance is complete.
Interestingly, several popular matching problems that are intractable in bipartite graphs become tractable in complete bipartite graphs. The min-cost popular matching problem in bipartite graphs is such a problem-this is NP-hard in a bipartite graph with incomplete lists [8] , however it can be solved in polynomial time in a bipartite graph with complete lists [7] . The difference is due to the fact that while there is no efficient description of the convex hull of all popular matchings in a general bipartite graph, this polytope has a compact extended formulation in a complete bipartite graph.
It is a simple observation (see Section 2) that when n is odd, a matching in a complete graph G on n vertices is popular only if it is stable. Since there is an efficient algorithm to decide if G admits a stable matching or not, the popular roommates problem in a complete graph G can be efficiently solved when n is odd. We show the following result here.
Theorem 1. Let G be a complete graph on n vertices, where n is even. The problem of deciding whether G admits a popular matching or not is NP-hard.
So the popular roommates problem with complete preference lists is NP-hard for even n while it is easy to solve for odd n. Note that the popular roommates problem is non-trivial for every n ≥ 5, i.e., there are both "yes instances" and "no instances" of size n. It is rare and unusual for a natural decision problem in combinatorial optimization to be efficiently solvable when n has one parity and become NP-hard when n has the other parity. We are not aware of any natural optimization problem on graphs that is non-trivially tractable when the cardinality of the vertex set has one parity, which becomes intractable for the other parity.
Background and related work
The first polynomial time algorithm for the stable roommates problem was by Irving [16] in 1985. Roommates instances that admit stable matchings were characterized in [24] . New polynomial time algorithms for the stable roommates problem were given in [23, 25] .
Algorithmic questions for popular matchings in bipartite graphs have been well-studied in the last decade [1, 7, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19] . Not much was known on popular matchings in non-bipartite graphs. Biró et al. [1] proved that validating whether a given matching is popular can be done in polynomial time, even when ties are present in the preference lists. It was shown in [14] that every roommates instance G = (V, E) admits a matching with unpopularity factor O(log |V |) and that it is NP-hard to compute a least unpopularity factor matching. It was shown in [15] that computing a max-weight popular matching in a roommates instance with edge weights is NP-hard, and more recently, that computing a max-size popular matching in a roommates instance is NP-hard [20] .
The complexity of the popular roommates problem was open for several years [1, 6, 14, 15 ,21] and two independent NP-hardness proofs [8, 11] of this problem were announced very recently. Interestingly, both these hardness proofs need "incomplete preference lists", i.e., the underlying graph is not complete. The reduction in [11] is from a variant of the vertex cover problem called the partitioned vertex cover problem and we discuss the reduction in [8] in Section 1.2 below. So the complexity status of the popular roommates problem in a complete graph was an open problem and we resolve it here.
Computational hardness for instances with complete lists has been investigated in various matching problems under preferences. An example is the three-sided stable matching problem with cyclic preferences: this involves three groups of participants, say, men, women, and dogs, where dogs have weakly ordered preferences over men only, men have preferences over women only, and finally, women only list the dogs. If these preferences are allowed to be incomplete, the problem of finding a weakly stable matching is known to be NP-complete [2] . It is one of the most intriguing open questions in stable matchings [21, 26] as to whether the same problem becomes tractable when lists are complete.
Techniques
The 1-in-3 SAT problem is a well-known NP-hard problem [22] : it consists of a 3-SAT formula φ with no negated literals and the problem is to find a truth assignment to the variables in φ such that every clause has exactly one variable set to true. We show a polynomial time reduction from 1-in-3 SAT to the popular roommates problem with complete lists.
Our construction is based on the reduction in [8] that proved the NP-hardness of the popular roommates problem. However there are several differences between our reduction and the reduction in [8] . The reduction in [8] considered a popular matching problem in bipartite graphs called the "exclusive popular set" problem and showed it to be NP-hard-when preference lists are complete, this problem can be easily solved. Thus the reduction in [8] needs incomplete preference lists.
The exclusive popular set problem asks if there is a popular matching in the given bipartite graph where the set of matched vertices is S, for a given even-sized subset S. A key step in the reduction in [8] from this problem in bipartite graphs to the popular matching problem in nonbipartite graphs merges all vertices outside S into a single node. Thus the total number of vertices in the non-bipartite graph used in [8] is odd. Moreover, the fact that popular matchings always exist in bipartite graphs is crucially used in this reduction. However in our setting, the whole problem is to decide if any popular matching exists in the given graph-thus there are no popular matchings that "always exist" here.
The reduction in [8] primarily uses the LP framework of popular matchings in bipartite graphs from [17, 18, 20] to analyze the structure of popular matchings in their instance. The LP framework characterizing popular matchings in non-bipartite graphs is more complex [20] , so we use the combinatorial characterization of popular matchings [13] in terms of forbidden alternating paths/cycles to show that any popular matching in our instance will yield a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for φ. To show the converse, we use a dual certificate similar to the one used in [8] to prove the popularity of the matching that we construct using a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for φ.
Label every edge (u, v) that does not belong to M by the pair (vote u (v, M ), vote v (u, M )). Thus every non-matching edge has a label in {(±, ±)}. Note that an edge is labeled (+, +) if and only if it is a blocking edge to M . Let G M be the subgraph of G obtained by deleting edges labeled (−, −) from G. The following theorem characterizes popular matchings in G. Using the above characterization, it can be easily checked whether a given matching is popular or not [13] . Thus our NP-hardness result implies that the popular roommates problem is NP-complete.
When n is odd. Recall the claim made in Section 1 that when n is odd, every popular matching in G has to be stable. A simple proof of this statement is included below.
Observation 1 ( [12] ) Let G be a complete graph on n vertices, where n is odd. Any popular matching in G has to be stable.
Proof. Suppose not. Let M be a popular matching in G that is not stable. So there is a blocking edge (u, v) to M . Because n is odd, we know that there is an unmatched vertex. If one of u, v is unmatched, then the edge (u, v) is a forbidden alternating path for popularity (by Theorem 2, part (3)). So let the unmatched vertex be x / ∈ {u, v}. Then the path x -(M (u), u) -(v, M (v)) with respect to M is again a forbidden alternating path for popularity (by Theorem 2, part (3)). Thus M is not a popular matching.
The graph G
Recall that φ is the input formula to 1-in-3 SAT. The graph G that we construct here consists of gadgets in 4 levels along with 2 special gadgets that we will call the D-gadget and Z-gadget. Gadgets in level 1 correspond to variables in the formula φ while gadgets in levels 0, 2, and 3 correspond to clauses in φ. Variants of the gadgets in levels 0-3 and the D-gadget were used in [8] while the Z-gadget is new.
We will now describe these gadgets: along with a figure, we provide the preference lists of vertices in this gadget. The tail of each list consists of all vertices not listed yet, in an arbitrary order. Even though the preference lists are complete, the structure of the gadgets and the preference lists will ensure that inter-gadget edges will not belong to any popular matching, as we will show in Section 4. 3 and the preference lists of these vertices are as given in Fig. 1 with all vertices outside the D-gadget at the tail of each list (in an arbitrary order). Recall that this gadget admits no stable matching.
We describe gadgets from level 1 first, then levels 0, 2, 3, and finally, the Z-gadget. The stable matchings within the gadgets are highlighted by colors in the figures. The gray elements in the preference lists denote vertices that are outside this gadget. We will assume that D in a preference list stands for
Level 1. For each variable X i in the formula φ, we construct a gadget on four vertices as shown in Fig. 2 . The bottom vertices x ′ i and y ′ i will be preferred by some vertices in level 0 to vertices in their own gadget, while the top vertices x i and y i will be preferred by some vertices in level 2 to vertices in their own gadget. All four vertices in a level 1 gadget prefer to be matched among themselves, along the four edges drawn than be matched to any other vertex in the graph. This gadget has a unique stable matching {(
To each clause c = X i ∨ X j ∨ X k in the formula φ, we create 6 gadgets in level 0. One of these can be seen in Fig. 3 . The top two vertices, i.e. a The Z-gadget. The Z-gadget is on 6 vertices z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 , z 5 and the preference lists of these vertices are given in Fig. 6 . The vertices in a set stand for all these vertices in an arbitrary order. For example, ∪ i {x i , y i } denotes all the "top" vertices belonging to variable gadgets in an arbitrary order. Note that G is a complete graph on an even number of vertices and so every popular matching in G has to be a perfect matching.
Popular edges in G
Call an edge e in G popular if there is a popular matching M in G such that e ∈ M . In this section we identify edges that are not popular and show that every popular edge is an intra-gadget edge, connecting two vertices of the same gadget.
The following observation, which is straightforward, will be used repeatedly in our proofs. If this is the same (+, +) edge then we have an alternating cycle in G M with a (+, +) edge, a contradiction to M 's popularity (by Theorem 2). If these are two different (+, +) edges then there is an alternating path in G M with two (+, +) edges, again a contradiction to M 's popularity (by Theorem 2).
(1) If v is a top choice neighbor for some vertex (such as 
Similarly, we can argue that there is a (+, +) edge reachable from s 
If s 
Recall that s The gadget D admits 2 popular matchings: Proof. Let M be a popular matching in G that contains such an edge (u, v). We know from Lemma 2 that either
Observe that both u and v cannot belong to the D-gadget as there is no such pair within D. If exactly one of u, v belongs to the D-gadget then (u, v) is not a popular edge (by Lemma 2). So neither u nor v belongs to the D-gadget and this implies that u prefers
Consider the following alternating cycle C with respect to M : 
Either the above is an alternating path in G M with two (+, +) edges or by replacing (x 
That is, if x ′ j is matched to a neighbor worse than y 
We investigate these two cases below.
• (a c 1 , z 1 ) ∈ M : Here both z 0 and z 1 are matched to vertices they prefer to all their neighbors inside the Z-gadget, except for z 4 and z 5 . We know that z 4 and z 5 must be matched inside the Z-gadget. There are 3 subcases and in each case there is an alternating cycle in G M with a blocking edge (a . This is again a contradiction to M 's popularity.
Recall that Lemma 2 showed that all vertices of D must be matched within the gadget. Thus z 0 cannot be matched to a vertex in the D-gadget. The case where z 0 is matched in M to a level 3 neighbor does not arise as such an edge would violate Lemma 3. This finishes our proof that any popular matching M matches the 6 vertices of the Z-gadget among themselves.
Lemma 6. The only popular matching inside the
Proof. The matching {(z 0 , z 1 ), (z 2 , z 3 ), (z 4 , z 5 )} is stable in the Z-gadget, thus this is a popular matching. Note that this gadget has no other stable matching.
Let M be any matching that matches the 6 vertices of the Z-gadget among themselves. Suppose M contains one or more of the edges (z i , z j ) where i = j mod 2 (colored black in Fig. 6 ). Without loss of generality, let (z 0 , z 2 ) ∈ M . There are three candidate matchings that we need to check for popularity: note that none is popular (by Theorem 2).
-{(z 0 , z 2 ), (z 1 , z 3 ), (z 4 , z 5 )}: this has the alternating cycle (z 2 , z 0 )
− (z 2 , z 0 ) with the blocking edge (z 0 , z 1 ).
-{(z 0 , z 2 ), (z 1 , z 4 ), (z 3 , z 5 )}: this has the alternating cycle (z 0 , z 2 )
− (z 0 , z 2 ) with the blocking edge (z 0 , z 4 ).
-{(z 0 , z 2 ), (z 1 , z 5 ), (z 3 , z 4 )}: this has the alternating cycle (z 2 , z 0 )
− (z 2 , z 0 ) with the blocking edge (z 3 , z 5 ).
Thus we can conclude that M ⊂ {z 0 , z 2 , z 4 } × {z 1 , z 3 , z 5 }. Suppose M contains an unstable edge here (colored in gray in Fig. 6 ), say (z 0 , z 3 ): among the vertices in the Z-gadget, z 3 is the last choice of z 0 and the edge (z 0 , z 2 ) blocks M . Since z 2 has to be matched in M , there are two cases.
Thus in both cases we have a contradiction to M 's popularity. Analogous proofs hold for other unstable edges chosen from {z 0 , z 2 , z 4 } × {z 1 , z 3 , z 5 }. Thus the only popular matching inside the Z-gadget is {(z 0 , z 1 ), (z 2 , z 3 ), (z 4 , z 5 )}.
Stable states versus unstable states
In this section we will show how to obtain a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for the input φ from any popular matching in G. The following definition will be useful to us.
Definition 2. A gadget A in G = (V, E) is said to be in unstable state with respect to matching M if there is a blocking edge (u, v) ∈ V (A) × V (A) with respect to M . If there is no such blocking edge to M then we say A is in stable state with respect to M .
In Figures 2-6 depicting our gadgets, corresponding to matchings that consist of colored edges within the gadget, the relevant gadget is in stable state. A level 1 gadget in unstable state will encode the corresponding variable being set to true while a level 1 gadget in stable state will encode the corresponding variable being set to false. We will now analyze what gadgets are in stable/unstable state with respect to any popular matching M in G. This will lead to the proof that for any clause c, exactly one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to the 3 variables in c is in unstable state. 
Thus there is no blocking edge within this gadget. As this holds for every level 0 gadget corresponding to c and for every clause c, the first part of the lemma follows.
We will now prove the second part of the lemma. Since M is a perfect matching, the vertices s Lemma 12) . We will now show the existence of an alternating path ρ that will contradict M 's popularity.
For this, we claim it suffices to show in stable state the following:
-one among the first three level 2 gadgets with a vertex that either s 
Again, observe that the labels on edges of ρ \ M are absolutely identical to the first two cases and ρ is the desired alternating path with two blocking edges (s As before, the labels on edges of ρ \ M are absolutely identical to the above three cases and ρ is the desired alternating path with two blocking edges (s Observe again that the labels on edges of ρ \ M are absolutely identical to the labels obtained for the desired alternating paths when i = 1 and j = 2. The path ρ is the desired alternating path in G M with two blocking edges (s 
Observe that ρ is an alternating path in G M with two blocking edges (x i , y i ) and (x j , y j ), a contradiction to M 's popularity. 
Observe that C is an alternating cycle in G M with a blocking edge (x i , y i ), a contradiction to M 's popularity. 
′ is an alternating path in G M with two blocking edges (x i , y i ) and (x j , y j ), a contradiction to M 's popularity.
We have shown that at most one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to X i , X j , X k is in unstable state with respect to M . So exactly one of the level 1 gadgets corresponding to X i , X j , X k is in unstable state with respect to M . This allows us to set a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment to instance φ. For each variable X i in φ do:
-if the gadget corresponding to X i is in unstable state then set X i = true else set X i = false. It follows from our above discussion that this is a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment for φ. We have thus shown the following result. 
The converse
We will now show the converse of Theorem 3, i.e., if φ has a 1-in-3 satisfying assignment S then G admits a popular matching. We will use S to construct a popular matching M in G as follows. To begin with, M = ∅.
Level 1. For each variable X i do:
-if X i is set to true in S then add (x i , y
For each clause c = X i ∨ X j ∨ X k , we know that exactly one of X i , X j , X k is set to true in S. Assume without loss of generality that X k = true in S. For the level 0, 2, and 3 gadgets corresponding to c, we do as follows: Observe that since the third variable X k of c was set to be true, cross edges are fixed in the first gadget (see Fig. 3 ), while the other stable matching (horizontal edges) is chosen in the second gadget.
For the fourth and fifth gadgets, we will do exactly the opposite. Also, it will not matter which stable pair of edges is chosen from the third and sixth gadgets. So for the last 3 level 0 gadgets corresponding to c (these are on vertices a We will now prove the popularity of the above matching M via the LP framework of popular matchings initiated in [17] for bipartite graphs. This framework generalizes to provide a sufficient condition for popularity in non-bipartite graphs [8] . This involves showing a witness α ∈ {0, ±1} |V | such that α is a certificate of M 's popularity. In order to define the constraints that α has to satisfy so as to certify M 's popularity, let us define an edge weight function w M as follows.
For any edge (u, v) in G do: Let the max-weight perfect fractional matching LP in the graph G with edge weight function w M be our primal LP. This is LP1 defined below. 
subject to e∈δ(u) x e = 1 ∀ u ∈ V and x e ≥ 0 ∀ e ∈ E.
If the primal optimal value is at most 0 then w M (N ) ≤ 0 for all perfect matchings N in G, i.e., φ(N, M ) ≤ φ(M, N ). This means φ(M ′ , M ) ≤ φ(M, M ′ ) for all matchings M ′ in G, since G is a complete graph on an even number of vertices (so M ′ ⊆ some perfect matching). That is, M is a popular matching in G.
Consider the LP that is dual to LP1. This is LP2 given below in variables α u , where u ∈ V . minimize u∈V α u (LP2) subject to
If we show a dual feasible solution α such that u∈V α u = 0 then the primal optimal value is at most 0, i.e., M is a popular matching.
In order to prove the popularity of M , we define α as follows. For each variable X r do:
-if X r was set to true then set α xr = α yr = 1 and α Let clause c = X i ∨ X j ∨ X k . Recall that we assumed that X i = X j = false and X k = true. For the vertices in clauses corresponding to c, we will set α-values as follows. -set α d0 = α d2 = −1 and α d1 = α d3 = 1.
Properties of α. For every (u, v) ∈ M , either α u = α v = 0 or {α u , α v } = {−1, 1}; so α u + α v = 0. Since M is a perfect matching, we have u∈V α u = 0. The claims stated below show that α is a feasible solution to LP2. This will prove the popularity of M .
We need to show that every edge (u, v) is covered, i.e., α u + α v ≥ w M (u, v). We have already observed that for any (u, v) ∈ M , α u + α v = 0 = w M (u, v). (u, v) be a blocking edge to M . Then α u + α v = 2 = w M (u, v).
Claim 4 Let
Proof. Level 1 gadgets that correspond to variables set to true have blocking edges. More precisely, for every variable X k set to true, (x k , y k ) is a blocking edge to M and we have α x k = α y k = 1. Thus α x k +α y k = 2 = w M (x k , y k ). Similarly, consider any level 2 or level 3 gadget that is in unstable state: such a gadget has a blocking edge within it, say (p
